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A B S T R A C T
This article links the use of you know in a group of mostly working-class
London adolescents (WCG) and I know in a mostly middle-class group
(MCG) to Foucault’s notion of power0knowledge and, by extension, to
group-specific (re)production of dominant discourses and power relations.
Speakers in WCG use you know clause-finally to mark the information in
that clause, which tends to be about the deviance of others, as dominant.
Speakers in MCG use I know either clause-initially or as a stand-alone item
in reaction to the previous speaker’s utterance and to mark that utterance as
dominant. Thus, the use of you know shows relatively active identity con-
struction while the use of I know shows relatively reactive identity construc-
tion, but both groups construct their identities indirectly: WCG because they
talk about others, and MCG because they react to others. Relations between
these processes and class and gender identities are discussed. (Adoles-
cence, identity, class, gender)
O V E R V I E W
Contribution to the field
This article develops the field of interdisciplinary research into the linguistic
construction of identity by highlighting specific links between pragmatic parti-
cles (Holmes 1997) and social constructionist theories. I explore the ways in
which such particles serve particular functions for the groups and individuals
who use them, and how these in turn can be related to the group dynamics out-
lined by various social theorists. The essay highlights how the young people in
the two London peer groups I have studied – one mostly working class (hereaf-
ter WCG) and the other mostly middle class (hereafter MCG) – reproduce, re-
inforce and occasionally challenge dominant discourse. It explores the link
between Foucault’s (1977, 1980) notion of power0knowledge and the verb “to
know” in spoken interaction. Although the link can be traced through both sets
of data, the ways it is manifested in the two groups show both similarities and
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differences. I link the similarities to the importance of the peer group in adoles-
cence (Seltzer 1989) and to the potential effects of its characteristics on
processes of identity construction. The differences I link to the young people
exploring their differing positions within the wider society.
Why you know and I know?
Patterns. The findings reported in this article form part of a larger project
that set out to look for themes and patterns in the conversational interaction of
two groups of young people and to analyze what these could tell us about how
they were constructing their identities. What first alerted me to the possibility
that these particular pragmatic particles might serve particular functions for the
respective groups was the preponderance of the verb “to know” in both sets of
data. I therefore decided to consider the possibility that the similarity between
the two pragmatic particles might be as important as their differences – that
although the collocation of “know” with “you” in WCG and with “I” in MCG
suggests differing speaker0hearer dynamics, the two might have similar func-
tions. I observed that both pragmatic particles were functioning as norm setters
or norm reinforcers. This suggested a strong link between norms and knowl-
edge, and I have therefore used Foucault’s (1977, 1980) concept of power0
knowledge to frame my analysis theoretically. I discuss this below and thereafter
discuss my own theoretical position in the light of other work on language and
identity construction generally, and you know and I know specifically.
Explicit marking of “knowledge.” By using the verb “to know,” the young
people label certain information explicitly as “knowledge.” It could be argued
that one of the functions of utterances in general is to relay speaker knowledge
(albeit that this is often not the primary function). We therefore need to ask why
the young people state this explicitly (or “perform” it) in some utterances and
not in others. It seems likely that those utterances whose “knowledge” status is
explicitly claimed are taken out of “neutral” territory and made more “visible”
for some reason. It seems therefore to be important for the young people explic-
itly to state their knowledge about various things. It is notable that the possibility
that they are stating precise knowledge of the various propositions can be re-
futed in the vast majority of utterances containing either you know or I know. It
is impossible to claim someone else’s knowledge of something (as in you know)
because knowledge is personal. In the case of I know, it is often the case that the
speaker could not in fact “know” what the previous speaker has said, for exam-
ple because the previous utterance presented the previous speaker’s emotions,
which are also personal. Thus, in a discussion about the relative merits of giving
up chocolate for Lent, Anna says I wish I could do that, to which Libby responds
I know I would like . . . ; later in the same conversation, Anna says yeah I know to
Cassie’s do not eat chocolate near me cause it’s like I really want to eat it. We
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must therefore consider the possibility that the knowledge the young people are
stating is less precise, that it is some kind of general social knowledge. It seemed
pertinent to consider whether Foucault’s theory of power0knowledge could help
to illuminate the functions of these utterances (or utterance parts) for their speak-
ers. Having analyzed the data in light of this theory, I claim that the use of you
know and I know is one of the procedures by which these speakers come to ac-
cept utterances as truth or dominant discourse (Foucault 1977).
T H E O R E T I C A L P O S I T I O N
Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge
Definition of power/knowledge. Foucault claims that there is a very close
relationship between power and knowledge, so close that central to his analysis
of society is the single concept “power0knowledge”: “There is no power rela-
tion without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowl-
edge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations”
(1977:27). Power0knowledge is not an essentialist concept. It is not a case of
knowing how the world works and thus making optimal choices that will give
one power over one’s existence. Knowledge is not absolute truth, because any
material fact that is interpreted linguistically will necessarily be altered in some
way in the process. However, Foucault claims that power0knowledge comes to
be seen as truth because language use reproduces and reinforces concepts. These
concepts come to be accepted as knowledge, and those who voice them repro-
duce and reinforce a worldview that is interpreted as “reality.” He is therefore
interested in documenting not what truth is but rather the procedures by which
something comes to be considered knowledge and, by extension, “truth.” Fou-
cault calls this language use “discourse.” Thus, to have power0knowledge is to
have access to the discourses that are dominant in a society. From this position
individuals can reproduce and thus reinforce those discourses.
It is clear, then, that “knowledge” is reproduced relationally rather than essen-
tially. Something can be evaluated positively only if something else is evaluated
negatively. The reproduction of dominant discourses necessitates identifying as
deviant other ways of viewing the world. Therefore, speakers who do not have
access to dominant discourses or who actively choose instead to voice nondom-
inant discourses will be marginalized. They will be considered not to have knowl-
edge and therefore will be powerless. Where their behavior is seen as a threat to
those in power, they may even be physically marginalized, for example in a prison
(Foucault 1977). They then come under constant surveillance (Foucault studies
the function of the panopticon) and can be “normalized” into behaving in ways
desired by those in power. Because of this and other material manifestations of
surveillance (a recent example would be closed-circuit television), the notion of
being watched and evaluated enters the psyche of individuals in a society to the
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extent that the material forms are no longer required: Individuals begin to self-
monitor from the point of view of the powerful. Furthermore, meaning within
dominant discourses is (re)constructed by marking out deviant categories against
which other categories can be viewed as the norm and, by extension, dominant.
To claim dominant knowledge, then, is also to claim, implicitly or explicitly, a
position of power for the speaker. These, then, are the two things that will be
examined in this article: the (re)construction of the dominant knowledge ac-
cepted by the peer group, and the self-positioning of the speaker in a position of
power.
Local reproduction of power/knowledge. Although Foucault illustrates the
concepts of dominance, deviance, and power0knowledge with reference to large
institutions, as I have mentioned, he constantly reiterates the idea that the power
relations in any society are dynamic; they are not initiated “at the top.” Relations
of power between individuals reproduce the norms that exist in society – in-
deed, it is due to these individual interactions that the dominant discourses and
norms come to exist in the first place: “These (micro-level) mechanisms of power
have been ‘invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, ex-
tended’ by more general forms, and these are what we tend to see as forms of
social power” (1980:99). The fact that the norms which exist in different soci-
eties or in the numerous subsections of any one society are not identical is evi-
dence for Foucault’s theory of the dynamic nature of relations of power. It follows
from this theory that, with each encounter, the individuals involved have the
capacity not just to reinforce the existing discourse(s) but also to challenge them
and perhaps even to develop or change them. This article, then, aims to show the
procedures by which norms are reproduced by young people in their peer groups,
to what extent they reinforce dominant discourses, and to what extent, if at all,
they challenge them.
Why adolescent peer groups explicitly reproduce power/knowledge
Peership versus friendship. Having observed that members of both the
groups I have studied explicitly voice their knowledge of dominant discourses,
we could tentatively claim that adolescent peer groups in general do this. The
question then arises as to why this should be the case. With reference to Seltzer
1989, I claim that this happens because the size of the peer group and the rela-
tions of difference therein necessitate more explicit norm setting. There has been
much illuminating work on the construction of identity in friendship groups as
opposed to peer groups (e.g., Coates 1999). Such groups offer much to such
studies – for example, a potentially higher level of self-disclosure. However, I
surmised that the looser relationships within peer groups would necessitate more
explicit performance of identity and so would be an important context in which
to view identity construction.
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It has been shown that even the youngest children reproduce society in their
play (Cook-Gumperz et al. 1986). However, Seltzer claims that whereas in ear-
lier childhood it tends to be friendship groups that are the main site for identity
construction, in adolescence the focus changes to the peer group (Seltzer
1989:21). Peer groups are less likely than friendship groups to be gender- and0or
class-specific. Even if they are, however, they are still bigger than friendship
groups and so make difference a more salient issue than it would be in friendship
groups. This is not to deny that young people in friendship groups talk about
people who are different from them. But young people in peer groups are much
more likely to have to interact with people who are significantly different
from them. Increased size and difference mean that it will take relatively more
work to negotiate power relations and set norms. We could therefore expect to
see this being done more explicitly.
The peer group as a nascent society in microcosm. Young people are of course
influenced by the norms of, for example, the media, class relations, and gender
relations that are reproduced by the society in which they live. However, in their
peer groups they reproduce group-specific versions of these. For example, Eck-
ert 1995 illustrates young people’s using certain phonetic variables to construct
an identity that orients either toward or away from the urban center. Membership
in the “burnout” and “jock” groups bears some relation to the social class struc-
ture of the community in general, working-class and middle-class respectively.
However, an individual young person’s membership in one or the other group
cannot be seen to be determined by his or her family’s social class identity. So,
the norms reproduced by the peer group can vary considerably from those that
are reproduced by the wider society. Because of this, we must, in my opinion,
view the peer group not simply as a subsection of society but as a society in
microcosm. Moreover, the setting of norms and relations of power will be par-
ticularly salient to such groups because they are relatively “new”: They could be
described as societies in their nascent stages. The onset of adolescence tends to
coincide with a change of school and increased independence from the family. It
is therefore likely that young people will form new relationships and spend the
majority of their time with their peers. It is true that the majority of children
experience different forms of peer group interaction from a young age. How-
ever, in many cases this interaction consists of structured activities overseen by
adults, whether in school or in various clubs or organizations. Even during times
of play, there is sometimes an adult within earshot who is in a position to moni-
tor “problematic” activity. Thus, there is a continuum of observed0unobserved
peer-group activity along which children move. It could be claimed that the pe-
riod of adolescence is the first time that the balance is weighted more toward
unobserved peer group activity for a majority. It is the first time that most young
people spend most of their time with other people of relatively equal status to
themselves. Relations of power are not seen to be predestined, as they are in the
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school or in the family. Rather, they are in a constant state of flux and must
continually be negotiated. It is therefore not surprising that we see the young
people in my data explicitly reproducing dominant discourses and relations of
power.
M E T H O D O L O G Y
In an attempt to highlight links between young people’s conversational inter-
action and their construction of identity, I decided to focus on spontaneous peer
group interaction in a non-school setting. By contacting the group leaders of
various drama groups, I gained access to two groups. I chose drama groups for
the purely practical reason of voice recognition. Voice recognition was a poten-
tial problem for two related reasons, numbers of young people and lack of con-
tact. I was looking not for friendship group interaction but for overall peer group
interaction, and this meant that I could have many (if not all) the young people
from any one group on tape. I would therefore need some kind of prolonged
contact with the young people in order to get to know their voices. However,
other considerations precluded this. I wanted my data to be as spontaneous as
possible and therefore wanted my presence to alter the group dynamic as little as
possible (cf. Labov’s [1972] notion of the “observer’s paradox”). I therefore de-
cided to approach drama groups. In this context it would be possible for me both
to record the young people interacting casually prior to the session and in break
times, and to observe them interacting verbally in structured sessions. The for-
mer would provide me with relatively more spontaneous data, while the latter
would enable me to familiarize myself with individual voices, something that
would be essential when I came to transcribe.
One group (WCG) was based in a working-class area of North London, and
the other (MCG) in a middle-class area of South West London. Group member-
ship was not completely made up of individuals of one or other class grouping,
but it was predominantly so. Initially I met with the young people, explained that
I was interested in seeing how they interacted with one another, and discussed
with them the possibility of taping some of their conversations. Once I had an-
swered various questions about what my work would be used for and who would
see it, the young people all agreed to be taped. There were on average twelve
participants in each group each time I recorded. I attended each group six times
over a three-month period and on average one hour of data was recorded during
each visit, so the total dataset for each group was approximately six hours.
I explained to the young people that they could rerecord or destroy the tapes
at any time if they were not happy with what was on them. The actual taping was
done in unstructured pre-session or break times, and on each occasion I gave a
Dictaphone to one young person. I asked her or him simply to press the record
button and carry the Dictaphone around discreetly while interacting as normal.
This meant that, while all the young people were aware that they would be re-
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corded at some point, they were not aware of specific recordings until afterward.
This, I believe, created the optimal balance between meeting ethical guidelines
and gathering spontaneous data. In order to maintain the participants’ anonym-
ity, all names were changed during the transcription process.
Seltzer observes that adolescents’ selves are not distinct, that boundary lines
are blurred (1989:21). Considering this possibility, I decided that a “one at a
time” representation of adolescent talk was likely to be unsuitable. For this rea-
son, I have used the stave format of transcription suggested by Edelsky 1981 and
developed by Coates 1986, 1988, and 1996. This aims to show conversation as a
collaborative rather than a “one at a time” venture.1
R E L A T E D W O R K
Identity construction
Identity as co-constructed. Recent work in various fields such as sociology,
psychology, and cultural studies has begun to see identity not as a fixed state but
as something that is co-constructed by speakers as they interact with one an-
other. Recent linguistic work in this area has become increasingly interdisciplin-
ary, with various studies interpreting linguistic data in terms of social theory
(early examples include Eckert 1988, 1993; Kiesling 1998).
Use of Foucauldian theory in sociolinguistic analysis. Particularly relevant
to this article are those studies that have used Foucauldian theory in their analy-
sis. The earliest of these was undertaken by Fraser & Cameron 1989, who high-
light apparent contradictions in the input of individual adolescent speakers into
conversation but challenge definition of these as contradictions. They claim that
the idea of a fixed social world (and therefore of truth) is a myth, and that we
should study instead the ways in which we construct our world through language
(1989:28–29). They therefore analyze the “contradictions” in terms of the young
people’s attempts to make sense of society via the interplay of various dis-
courses (1989:32). In later work, Cameron 1997 highlights the importance of
considering both form and content of conversation. In her data, young men use
an apparently cooperative style of talk but the content consists of “the same old
gendered script” (1997:64). Coates 1999 observes that the adolescent girls in her
data use various discourses to position themselves as women: liberal, patriar-
chal, pseudo-scientific, and so on. At the age of about 14, a change in linguistic
features suggests the advent of a new discourse that she calls the “discourse of
consciousness raising.” However, this discourse is in competition with the fact
that the content of what they say often comes from a patriarchal, repressive
discourse.
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You know and I know
You know. In the previous literature on you know, there is disagreement as to
whether or not use of you know has anything to do with knowledge. Macaulay
2002 claims that it does not, at least for his Glasgow and Ayr groups. He puts
forward the argument that you know has been grammaticalized and, as such, any
prior meaning has been “bleached out” (2002:755). He gives two main reasons
for this. The first, more tentative, is that you know can occur in close proximity
to the verb “know” in its basic function. The second, more relevant to my re-
search, is that “‘you know’ is frequently used before or after statements that
clearly do not represent shared knowledge” (2002:755). What exactly we mean
by “shared knowledge” is important here – in brief, whether we mean knowl-
edge about events or knowledge about norms. I return to this point below in light
of my analysis.
Fox Tree & Schrock 2002, in their review of the literature on you know, cite
differences of opinion on what random sprinkling of you know tells us about the
speaker: Lalljee & Cook 1975 and Ragan 1983 (cited in Fox Tree & Schrock
2002:729) claim it shows uncertainty or anxiousness, while Erman 1987 (cited
in Fox Tree & Schrock 2002: 729) claims it shows certainty. Lakoff 1975 and
Fishman 1980 also claim the former. As work in this field has developed, re-
searchers have come to see that, since language is always used in social con-
texts, we cannot take an essentialist approach to function but should view particles
as polypragmatic. For example, Cameron et al. 1988 find that tag questions serve
different functions for different speakers in different contexts. Holmes 1985, 1986
and Bonnano 1995 (cited in Holmes 1997) find that you know can function ei-
ther as a hedge or as a booster, the former lessening and the latter increasing the
force of the proposition. Holmes 1997 defines such particles as “interactive.”
She claims that for this reason they cannot be considered to have essential func-
tions but instead will serve particular social functions for particular speakers.
Cameron et al. 1988 also find that tag questions in general serve different func-
tions for different speakers in different contexts. While we must be aware of the
fact that every utterance of you know or I know could serve a different function,
it is also the case that repeated use within a particular group can result in rela-
tively fixed group-specific social meanings, as Hewitt 1986 found in the “lexical
inventiveness” and meaning alteration of older words (1986:114) illustrated by
the young people in his study.
Fox Tree & Schrock also outline the work of researchers who have found that,
for their data, you know does indicate some degree of shared knowledge. The
two proposals for the basic meaning of you know are related but differ in that one
invites the addressee to “fill out unspoken intention” (Jucker & Smith 1998, cited
in Fox Tree & Schrock 2002:737), while the other checks on or demonstrates
shared views. For example, Schiffrin found, in her interviews, that you know
sometimes “marks the general consensual truths which speakers assume their
A N T H E A I R W I N
506 Language in Society 35:4 (2006)
hearers share through their co-membership in the same culture, society or group”
(1996:274). Ostman’s (1981, cited in Fox Tree & Schrock 2002:736–37) con-
clusion is a slightly more proactive variation of this: that “the speaker strives
towards getting the addressee to cooperate and0or accept the prepositional con-
tent of his utterance as mutual background knowledge” (Fox Tree & Schrock
2002:736–37). I have found Schiffrin’s and Ostman’s work to be particularly
relevant to my own research. I give reasons for this and position my work in
relation to theirs below.
I know. There has not been any work done specifically on I know, as far as I
can ascertain. However, we could perhaps view it as a relatively focused mini-
mal response. It has been documented by various researchers (Zimmerman &
West 1975, Fishman 1980) that women use minimal responses more than men
do in mixed-sex conversation. Coates claims that this does not entail women’s
powerlessness: Minimal responses are used regularly during the conversations
of women who are friends and equals (Coates 1988:106). From the previous
literature, we could therefore view I know as a supportive device which encour-
ages the continuation of the conversation.
D A T A A N A L Y S I S : T H E U S E O F ‘ Y O U K N O W ’ I N T H E A C T I V E
( R E ) P R O D U C T I O N O F P O W E R 0 K N O W L E D G E
The tonal nature of you know in these data
The tonal nature of the version of you know dealt with in this article is the same
as that documented by Hewitt 1986: a low tone on you and low rising tone on
know. I have illustrated this simply below.
•
• -
• - -
Y o u k n o w
This similarity to Hewitt’s findings could suggest that the young people using
you know in these data are constructing an identity that draws on recognizable
markers of ethnicity. In the peer group Hewitt studied, markers of Jamaican iden-
tity were drawn upon not only by Jamaican young people, but also by black
young people who were not from a Jamaican background, and, more notably
perhaps, by white young people. This served to bring more solidarity to the group
and to allow the young people to perform their resistance to authority more
explicitly.
This version of you know almost always appears in clause-final position, for
example you’re bad you know (Maria to Jay). On occasion it appears in clause-
initial position but can be differentiated from another version of you know that
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the speakers use as a topic initiator, both tonally and owing to the fact that know
is more heavily stressed in the former version. Topic-initiating you know has a
mid tone on you and a high tone on know. This is illustrated below.
• -
• -
•
Y o u k n o w
You know with the latter tonal pattern appears in the following utterance from
Kevin: you know you know s- you know sometimes you know sometimes you
know when you’re having (.h) a- an argument and you’re really angry what do
you say about them, where it can be clearly seen that he is initiating a topic. The
following utterance from Jay includes an example of each type of you know and
shows clearly their different functions: hey you know that other Jay he’s gay you
know.
Constructing self as dominant and other as deviant
Sexuality. In excerpt (1) below, Kevin uses you know to mark Jason’s alleg-
edly being gay as salient. He then goes on to reproduce a link between feminine
gender characteristics and male homosexuality, suggesting that a boy’s being
gay is to be viewed as not just salient, but deviant. That said, it can be argued
that the main difference Kevin reacts to in “othering” Jason is not sexual orien-
tation but rather, although he does not voice it explicitly, social class. Once sex-
ual orientation is on the agenda, however, Jay engages with it. He identifies
partially with the deviant position but does so ambiguously so as to maintain his
dominant position. Overall, an interesting interplay between class, gender and
sexuality is illustrated in the boys’ discourse.
(1) Participants: Jay, Kevin and Richard. In lines marked fe, words enclosed by “ ” are
spoken in a high-pitched, mock-feminine manner.
1
J:
K: hey you know that other Jay he’s gay you know (1.0)
R:
.................................................................................................................................................
2
J: huh 
fe K: that other Jay’s gay (.) the way he talks (0.5) “Richard
R:  [indec. 1.0] (.)
.................................................................................................................................................
3
J: I thought that was last week (.)
K: (.) no Richard no (.) no Richard” (1.0) no it
R:
.................................................................................................................................................
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4
J:
K: wasn’t [indec. 1.0] blah blah blah (.h) no but it was me and Jay that was
R:
.................................................................................................................................................
5
J: well I speak
K: doing it you weren’t here the other week it was me and Jay (.)
R:
.................................................................................................................................................
6
J: more like a girl than him (0.5) my voice is more like a girl’s than his (1.0)
K:
R: no
.................................................................................................................................................
7
J: no (.)
K: laughs (.) [indec. 0.0] (.)
R: (.) you just want to fuck him (.) I know
.................................................................................................................................................
8
J:
K:
R: your chat up line
.................................................................................................................................................
In stave 1, Kevin talks about that other Jay. There is only one boy called “Jay”
in the group, the one involved in this conversation. As I sat in on some of the
group’s drama activities, I was able to recognize from the utterance Kevin re-
counts that he is talking about Jason. Other parts of my analysis suggest that
Kevin is making a salient point rather than an error here: Incorrect naming is a
strategy for symbolically excluding members of the group or making them more
peripheral.
Jason could be considered an outsider on a class basis. The majority of the
young people in this group come from working-class areas in the boroughs of
Hackney and Haringey. A minority, including Jason, come from middle-class
areas in the borough of Islington. Even had I not known this, it is clear from my
data that the young people divide themselves roughly into these majority and
minority groupings. This relates to Eckert’s (1995) work mentioned above, in
which young people reproduce group-specific identities that draw on but are not
determined by wider social class identities. The class difference is generally left
implicit in my data; the salient categories by which groups divide themselves are
sexuality, ethnicity, gender, age, and style. These categories are interlinked in
various illuminating ways.
Kevin gives the way he talks (stave 2) as his reason for thinking that Jason is
gay and then mimics him by speaking in a high-pitched, feminine way. In doing
this, he reproduces a link between male homosexuality and feminine gender char-
acteristics. However, Jason’s voice is not particularly high-pitched compared with
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other boys in the group, so we could surmise that the way he talks actually refers
to Jason’s accent, which, while not Received Pronunciation, is significantly closer
to it than Jay’s, Kevin’s, and Richard’s. If this is the case, then Kevin is repro-
ducing the equating of the working class with masculinity and the middle class
with femininity.
In staves 5 and 6, Jay challenges Kevin’s marking of dominant discourse. He
introduces his utterance with well, suggesting what follows will challenge in
some way what has gone before, but the nature of the challenge is ambiguous.
He could mean either of two things: (a) that, because his voice is more like a
girl’s than Jason’s, he is more likely to be gay than Jason is; or (b) taking for
granted that he (Jay) is not gay, having a voice . . . like a girl’s does not necessar-
ily make one a candidate for homosexuality. In the first of these options, he can
be seen to keep open the negotiation of which positions are to be considered
dominant and which are to be considered deviant. In the second option, he ques-
tions the link between homosexuality and effeminacy, and by extension ques-
tions group boundaries and the conditions for group membership. He could be
purposefully ambiguous here. He places himself in Jason’s place in order to ex-
perience the reactions of the other two (option a), but has a “get-out clause”
(option b). He thus identifies with what would be seen by the other boys as a
deviant position, but this identification is tentative and partial.
In staves 7 and 8, Richard “accuses” Jay of option (a). Jay denies option (a),
but this is not entirely successful (Richard continues to make fun of him). Jay
then chooses to change the topic, leaving “gay as deviant” as a salient but open
topic.
Ethnicity and sexual behavior. Excerpt (2) leads directly on from (1) above.
In it, Richard uses you know to mark I’m fucking her and don’t use your fingers
as salient, suggesting that he is linking the two utterances in some way. The link
appears to be that it is acceptable to engage in full penetration with the girl in
question, but that other aspects of intimate contact with her are taboo. The boys
lead up to the use of you know by differentiating between “sex” and “going out
with” people and by differentiating between girls of different ethnicities in re-
gard to whom they would engage in which actions. Overall, the conversation
and uses of you know reproduce problematic discourses that link ethnicity with
(un)cleanliness, in turn reproducing oppressive power relations in a “micro” con-
text. Although in the previous example differences of social class are not voiced
at all, differences of ethnicity are voiced here, but the majority of the specific
“othering” is once again done on the basis of gender and sexuality. Once again,
there is evidence of a challenge to the construction of the deviant category. How-
ever, in this example it is unclear whether this is used to explore identity, or as a
cynical strategy to encourage reproduction of the boundary between dominant
and deviant.
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(2) Participants: Jay, Kevin and Richard.
1
J: his his his girl6friend 6 is Indian (.)
K: 6I know6 6mm6
R: 6my 6 girlfriend
.................................................................................................................................................
2
J: your Indian girl (1.0) well it’s l- (.) sh- she’s Indian or Kurdish (.)
K: mm (.)
R: (.)
.................................................................................................................................................
3
J: 6and he haven’t cussed them since he gone out with her6 (.) I
K: 6mm humming ......................................................... mm6 hasn’t what (.)
R:
.................................................................................................................................................
4
J: want him to cuss them (.) when he cusses the Kurds (2.0)
K: what’s that (.)
R:
.................................................................................................................................................
5
J: n- (.) [?I’ve only went out]
K: mm (1.0)
R: [?would you go out with] an Indian (.)
.................................................................................................................................................
6
J: with a (.) a Kurd the [?sex] would be good 
K:
R:  [?it would be quite] good (.)
.................................................................................................................................................
7
J:
K: there’s one girl [?that’s gone with] er Jay (0.5) erm not you the other one
R:
.................................................................................................................................................
8
J:
K:  huh (.)
R:  what the nice [?1 wd] girl (.) oh she’s much nicer than Jewish
.................................................................................................................................................
9
J: 6aye aye aye6
K: but I’d never go out with them (.) 6indec.
R: (.) 6that’s what you6 said (0.5) 6[?you
.................................................................................................................................................
10
J:
K: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [?would you]6
R: wouldn’t (.) [indec . . . . . . . . . . .]6 (.) I’m fucking her you know (.) [“my
.................................................................................................................................................
11
J:
K: you BASTARD (.) you g- oh
R: cookie” (.) don’t use your fingers you know] (.)
.................................................................................................................................................
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12
K: you’re EVIL (Cut)
R:
The construction of dominant and deviant positions in the early part of the
extract can be summarized as follows. Jay answers Richard’s challenge that he
(Jay) is (sexually) deviant by saying his girlfriend is Indian (stave 1). We can
surmise from this that he is meeting like with like and thus suggesting that Rich-
ard is deviant by associating him with someone who is deviant. We can therefore
surmise that Jay views Indian people as (ethnically) deviant (or that this is the
view upheld by the peer group). Jay introduces Kurdish girls into this ethnically
deviant category (stave 2). When Jay is asked whether he would go out with an
Indian (stave 5), he begins to answer no and then says I’ve only went out with a
Kurd (staves 5– 6, my emphasis). This suggests that Kurdish girls are less devi-
ant than Indian girls.
Perhaps to underline the partialness of his identification by passing over it
very quickly, Jay, without a pause, immediately shifts back from the “real” world
to the “possible” world of the modal auxiliary and says in stave 6 the sex would
be good (implying “with an Indian girl”). He has previously denied (or begun to
deny) the possibility of his going out with an Indian girl and now he asserts the
opinion that having sexual intercourse with an Indian girl would be good. This
suggests that having sexual intercourse with someone whom one considers de-
viant makes oneself less deviant than does going out with that person. It is in fact
treated positively: the sex would be good (Jay) 0 it would be quite good (Rich-
ard). Perhaps, then, the “otherness” of the “deviant” girl is being interpreted
positively (but still problematically) as mysteriousness (cf. Said’s [1978] theory
of Orientalism).
In staves 7 and 8, Kevin introduces a girl of unknown ethnicity into the con-
versation. By saying, in stave 8, that Kevin has claimed the girl in question is
much nicer than Jewish, Richard marks Jewish people as deviant, possibly more
deviant than any group discussed up until this point. This is not challenged; in
fact it is not even commented upon, suggesting that such evaluation of Jewish
people has been previously cemented into the boys’ discourse. Kevin then states
but I’d never go out with them, again contrasting sex and going out as acceptable
and unacceptable, respectively.
In staves 10 and 11, sexual intercourse is shifted for the first time from the
possible or fantasy world into the real world. (It is unclear whether the her Rich-
ard refers to is the girlfriend mentioned at the beginning of the extract or the girl
Kevin has just referred to.) Richard’s use of you know suggests that he is (re)pro-
ducing the dominant discourse of the group by offering advice or a rule to the
other boys. He says that having sexual intercourse with this girl is acceptable but
using your fingers is not, and the sex0relationship idea is thus broken down fur-
ther. He suggests that acceptable sex is restricted to conventional heterosexual
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intercourse ( fucking). He implies that using your fingers would cross the inter-
personal boundary at the wrong level and lead to pollution from the deviant other
(cf. Douglas 1966). So, Richard’s two uses of you know have accomplished two
things. First, they have cemented the dominant discourse norms that the boys
have been negotiating – that is, having sexual intercourse with someone who is
considered deviant is a positive thing whereas engaging in any other kind of
sexual activity with that person is a negative thing. Second, Richard has escaped
the negative position Jay placed him in by saying his girlfriend is Indian, and
repositions himself as dominant.
It is unclear whether Kevin’s utterance you’re evil (staves 11 and 12) is a
reaction to Jay or Richard, but in either case the strength of the reaction suggests
a recognition of the salience of any utterance tagged with you know. He could
have become aware that Jay has been recording the conversation. This interpre-
tation could be supported by the fact that the tape recorder is turned off immedi-
ately after Kevin’s utterance. On the other hand, it could show his awareness that
what the boys have been discussing would be frowned on in the wider society
(i.e., the racist nature of suggesting that a person would be “polluted” in some
way by having sexual relations with a person of a particular ethnicity). He may
think that Richard’s objectification of the girl has gone too far, or he may wish to
mark the fact that wider society would be of this opinion. The difference be-
tween these possibilities may be subtle, but their functions may be radically dif-
ferent. Is he criticizing Richard? Or is he actually drawing more attention to
what Richard has said, thus applauding him for having voiced this taboo dis-
course so fully?
It is interesting that in the first example above, Richard uses you know as part
of a statement of self-reference (I’m fucking her), whereas in the second he
uses it as part of a statement of other-reference: He warns against something
that would make the other boys deviant. In the first example Richard must regain
the dominant position that he has partly lost, whereas in the second example he
is simply reinforcing it (or making the shift complete). It could be, therefore,
that when dominant positioning is in question, the reference is to self in order to
reclaim that positioning. However, when the dominant positioning is unproblem-
atic, it is reinforced by differentiating oneself from the deviant other rather than
by restating one’s dominance.
Gender issues in the use of you know
For Richard and Kevin, positions are claimed via differentiation from a deviant
other provided by a third party. In contrast, when Jay and Maria converse with
each other, the speaker positions the hearer as the deviant other. There is a con-
sistent pattern regarding where you know appears. Jay tends to make the evalu-
ation and then back it up, whereas Maria tends to give evidence before making
the evaluation. Furthermore, Jay’s “reasons” for positioning Maria as deviant
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involve physical boundaries and pollution, whereas Maria’s “reasons” for posi-
tioning Jay as deviant involve the morality of interactive behavior. The follow-
ing excerpts are examples of Jay’s use of you know:
(3) Participants: Jay and Maria.
1
Jay: uh uh (.) you’re rude you know (0.5) how can you just come into my house
Mar:
.................................................................................................................................................
2
Jay: and sit down (0.5)
Mar:
(4) Participants: Jay and Maria.
1
Jay: you’re rude you know lying down on the chairs that’s look at that look at all
Mar:
.................................................................................................................................................
2
Jay: the piss marks on that chair (.)
Mar: [indec 1.0]
off: she did that innit
In excerpts (3) and (4), Jay evaluates Maria as rude before giving as evidence
the fact that she has intruded on his space (ex. 3) and has sat on soiled furniture
(ex. 4).
Excerpts (5), (6), and (7) are examples of Maria’s use of you know:
(5) Participants: Jay and Maria.
1
Jay:
Mar: oh do you
.................................................................................................................................................
2
Jay: no who would I [?want to] fancy (1.0)
Mar: fancy any of the girls (.) you do innit (.)
.................................................................................................................................................
3
Jay: ugh (1.0) that skinny thing (1.0) no (2.5)
Mar: Jo (.) oh yeah but any other girls (.)
.................................................................................................................................................
4
Jay: I’m not cussing her (.) she’s skinny (0.5) I’m just
Mar: why you cuss her then (0.5)
.................................................................................................................................................
5
Jay: a midget (0.5) I’m a midget (0.5)
Mar: you cuss her because she’s a midget (.) and
.................................................................................................................................................
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.................................................................................................................................................
6
Jay: yeah (.) she’s a tart (0.5)
Mar: because she’s skinny (.) you’re bad you know (.)
(6) Participants: Jay and Maria.
1
Jay: uh uh (.) you’re rude you know (0.5) how can you just come into my house
Mar:
.................................................................................................................................................
2
Jay: and sit down (0.5)
Mar: what do you mean your house (0.5) [?it’s not your] house
.................................................................................................................................................
3
Jay:
Mar: you know
(7) Participants: Jay, Maria, and Irene.
1
Jay: excuse me (1.0) your mum (.)
Mar: [laughs 2.0] 
Irene:  Jay why don’t you get
.................................................................................................................................................
2
Jay:
Mar: you’re so
Irene: yourself a [1 wd.] please cause you’re a bit on the lairy side (.)
.................................................................................................................................................
3
Jay:
Mar: bad you know (1.0) you’re so bad
In ex. (5), Maria debates the issue of why Jay has been cussing (criticizing)
Joanna (staves 4 and 5) before labeling him as bad (stave 6). In ex. (6), she
asks him what he means by saying that the space they are in is his house before
concluding that it is not his house and therefore labeling him as deviant for not
telling the truth. In ex. (7), the evidence comes from Irene (an adult reception-
ist): you’re a bit on the lairy side (stave 2). It would appear that Maria respects
Irene’s view and thus feels able to use it as evidence in labeling Jay as bad
(staves 2–3).
The above examples are evidence that Jay takes a more active0assertive0
aggressive stance than Maria in regard to self and other positioning. The follow-
ing utterance supports this. Maria’s position is reactive: She reacts to Jay’s
accusations and defends herself against them using you know as part of a state-
ment of self-reference:
L O N D O N A D O L E S C E N T S ( R E ) P R O D U C I N G P O W E R 0 K N O W L E D G E
Language in Society 35:4 (2006) 515
(8) Participants: Jay and Maria.
1
Jay: why say that for
Mar:
.................................................................................................................................................
2
Jay: about like I’m gonna die soon (0.5)
Mar: I didn’t say that you know (.)
However, in the utterance below Maria appears to share the other participants’
preference for using you know as part of a statement of other-reference. She
switches as Richard did in the utterance considered earlier, possibly suggesting
that she considers other-reference to be a more strategic choice than self-reference
as regards subject positioning.
(9) Participants: Jay, Maria and Joanna.
1
J:
M: anyway tell me J- Joanna   you know cos I tried to
Jo: mm
.................................................................................................................................................
2
J:
M: explain that I he’s lying (0.5)
Jo:
She begins to self-refer (I tried to explain that I ) and then switches to evaluating
the situation via reference to the other party, Jay (he’s lying). Obviously it is
important for Maria to strengthen the force of her utterance and highlight the
fact that she is telling the truth (as opposed to Jay, who is lying), and you know
helps to serve this purpose. However, it is more complex than this. She fulfills
two other functions concurrently with strengthening her utterance.
First, you know once again appears in its less regular clause-initial position.
This suggests that she is using it relatively more consciously than at other times.
This, coupled with the fact that she includes a third party, Joanna, to give addi-
tional evidence, suggests that she feels the position from which she moves to be
problematic.
Second, she seems to alter the relative positioning of herself and Jay. During
the course of this utterance, Maria moves from a reactive stance to an active one.
Her conversation with Jay has been competitive, and Jay has been continually
labeling her as deviant to claim a higher status position than hers. In this utter-
ance she begins reactively: She is reacting to Jay’s accusations and is about to
deny them. However, she alters her position to a more active one by moving out
of Jay’s discourse and into her own choice of discourse. She uses a moral dis-
course to label Jay as deviant (lying when he should be telling the truth). So she
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does not answer him on his own terms but rather actively changes the means of
evaluation.
So, in conclusion, we can see that Maria attempts to subvert the power rela-
tions that Jay has set up. To begin with, Jay labels Maria as deviant by using you
know with other-reference, and his style can be considered active because he
makes the accusation and then supplies evidence to support it. Maria uses two
strategies. One of these is to label Jay as deviant by using you know with other-
reference. However, in contrast to Jay, she first submits the evidence and then
concludes with the labeling. Her other strategy is to deny the label Jay has given
her by mirroring and counteracting his utterance: She uses you know for self-
reference along with a syntactically negative utterance, in this case. All of this,
alongside the basic fact that Jay is the first of the two speakers to use you know,
suggests that, in cross-sex adolescent talk, you know could be considered to be
primarily a masculine feature. Jay uses it to make an explicit verbal attack on
Maria; Maria then hijacks the feature and counteracts Jay’s attack, fighting him
on his own terms; finally, Maria uses the feature in an active way but changes
the discourse, moving into a more active position. She is, of course, still using
“Jay’s” feature, but she has changed the discourse it is used in conjunction with,
thus partially subverting the power relations that exist between them.
Analysis of other data from WCG supports the suggestion that you know is a
male feature. For example, in a long conversation between Alysha and Katrina,
you know (in this tonal form) is used only once, in the following utterance from
Alysha, in which she uses you know to claim that her coming late to the group is
acceptable because others do:
(10) Participants: Alysha, Katrina and Irene.
1
Al: what I’m saying (.) cos the- people do come late (.) you know 6I should6 come
Ka: 6mmm 6
...............................................................................................................................................
2
Al: late Irene innit (.) I should innit (.)
Ka:
Irene: it’s up to you (.) it’s up to you
It is interesting that you know appears in the marked utterance-initial position,
suggesting irregular use. (Alysha pauses after cos the people do come late, which
suggests that her you know is linked to the following I should come late Irene
innit.) Similarly to Maria, Alysha uses it after she has given evidence for her
case (other people come late to the group, therefore Alysha herself should come
late).
Thus, we can claim that you know is a feature mostly associated with male
speakers. The all-boy conversational group in my data use it to position them-
selves in relation to a third party deviant other by claiming knowledge of the
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dominant and deviant subject positions within the dominant discourse. In boy–
girl interaction, the boy uses you know to label the girl as deviant and thus set up
an unequal status relationship between the two speakers. The girls in my data
use you know only when conversing with a boy, apart from the special case an-
alyzed above (ex. 10). In the boy–girl conversation in question (between Jay and
Maria), the girl uses you know reactively to counteract the unequal status rela-
tionship. We also have one example of her being subversive and setting up an
opposing unequal status relationship (the girl has higher status than the boy).
Reviewing previous literature on you know in the light of this analysis
As stated above, Macaulay 2002 claims that, for his data, you know has been
grammaticalized and thus has nothing to do with knowledge. One of the reasons
he gives, and the one that is most relevant to my research, is that it is not used
with statements that represent “shared knowledge.” Macaulay appears to be re-
ferring to the fact that the utterances in question relay items of information to the
hearer for the first time (see also Schourup 1985 cited in Fox Tree & Schrock
2002:735). This differs from my interpretation of “shared knowledge,” which, in
the context of this article, has to do with shared knowledge of norms. The analy-
sis above has shown speakers using you know to reproduce norms, and I would
claim that you know in several of the examples Macaulay cites can be interpreted
in a similar way. The following example from Macaulay’s data clearly deals with
norms of gendered behavior in a partnership or marriage:
and he said “you didn’t tell me you were going out” and I said “Yes I did” “No
you didn’t” you know so the next morning he was going out to work and he
said “Well will I see you for tea tonight?” you know “Will you be home” you
know. (2002:756)
It is interesting that the examples of Macaulay’s that I would analyze as dealing
with shared norms all come from the category in which you know appears
utterance-finally, as these correspond with the group-specific use of you know in
my data.
Another similarity between Macaulay’s findings and my own is that working-
class young males in Macaulay’s data used you know more frequently than
working-class young females, although the difference he finds is not highly sig-
nificant, and this is the only part of the sample in which males use the feature
more than females. That said, Macaulay’s you know is tonally different from
mine in that it has a falling intonation, and we have seen that the significance of
gender in the use of you know varies greatly from study to study; both of these
points remind us to maintain focus on the use of pragmatic particles for individ-
uals and specific groups rather than attempting any mass generalizations.
It is also interesting to revisit Schiffrin’s finding that you know sometimes
“marks the general consensual truths which speakers assume their hearers share
through their co-membership in the same culture, society or group” (1996:274).
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She found this conclusion more likely where you know had a falling intonation.
This differs from you know in my data, which has a low rising intonation. Obvi-
ously this could be partly to do with idiosyncratic usage in this particular group,
but perhaps it is also to do with the fact that whereas Schiffrin presupposes agree-
ment, the young people in my data are still negotiating what the dominant dis-
courses of their group should be, albeit proactively. On this point, of the studies
cited above, Ostman’s (1981) conclusion is the one that fits most closely with
my own findings. To recapitulate, he found that “the speaker strives towards
getting the addressee to cooperate and0or accept the prepositional content of his
utterance as mutual background knowledge” (Fox Tree & Schrock 2002:736–
37). More general conclusions on you know in this data set, and its relationship
to I know, will be made at the end of the article.
D A T A A N A L Y S I S : I KNOW
The double function of I know: To mark and claim knowledge of the domi-
nant discourse
Excerpt (11) provides a good introductory illustration of the function of I know
for MCG. The girls are discussing a planned visit by someone who wishes to
speak to the young people about “teenage sex.” While part of the reason Diane
says I know in stave 8 seems to be to mark the fact that she does actually know
about this planned visit but had simply forgotten about it, I would argue that she
is also marking the importance of what Lana has said about the status of 16-year-
olds in terms of social norms.
(11) Participants: Diane and Lana.
1
Di:
Lan: 6and then6 like there’s this person who’s coming in yeah
...............................................................................................................................................
2
Di:
Lan: to talk there’s this twenty one year old yeah (.) they’re doing this play
...............................................................................................................................................
3
Di:  where’s this  6 in 6
Lan: about sex teenage sex   and they’re coming in 6right6
...............................................................................................................................................
4
Di: your school (.)
Lan: no at erm (.) the theatre yeah and they want to come in
...............................................................................................................................................
5
Di: 6oh yeah yeah yeah
Lan: and talk to us (.) or like the older people of us 6so that they know what
...............................................................................................................................................
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6
Di: yeah 6
Lan: it’s just6 cause they can’t remember what it’s like to be sixteen and
...............................................................................................................................................
7
Di:
Lan: they’re twenty one (.) and you’re thinking well (.) it can’t be that long
...............................................................................................................................................
8
Di:  yeah 6yeah I know Lindy was saying that last week (.)
Lan: ago 6it’s a bit dumb really
Lana’s words in staves 6–8 superficially comment on the fact that five years
(that is, the time between being 16 and being 21) is not a long enough time to
merit having forgotten how it feels to be 16. It would seem to me, however, that
the evaluation goes further: Lana is actually commenting negatively on the fact
that such a visible difference is made between 16-year-olds and 21-year-olds, to
the point that the two are seen as being at different life stages. Presumably she
thinks that 16-year-olds should be viewed more as adults than they are. Diane
both marks this as dominant knowledge and claims the knowledge for herself by
saying I know.
In excerpt (12), Tim uses I know to equate long hair with “horribleness.” Thus,
even though he has long hair, he still positions himself in the dominant dis-
course of style:
(12) Participants: Tim and Lily.
1
Ti: yeah I need to get it cut badly don’t I (.)
Li: it’s longer that’s what it is (.)
...............................................................................................................................................
2
Ti: yeah I know it’s horrible (.) who me-
Li: men have short hair now (.)
...............................................................................................................................................
3
Ti: yeah (.)
Li:
...............................................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................
Note that Tim puts stress on horrible as well as on know, so the sense of what he says is not
“I know (that) it’s horrible.” Furthermore, Tim’s me- (stave 2) sounds like the beginning of
the word “men” as opposed to the word “me.”
In excerpt (13), the young people talk about chocolate. After some discussion
about giving up chocolate for Lent, Libby uses I know to mark as dominant the
discourse about the positive nature of denying oneself chocolate (particularly if
this can be permanent).
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(13) Participants: Libby, Celia and Andrew.
1
L: Lent (1.0)
C: how come you’re not eating chocolate (.)
A: same as me I’ve
...............................................................................................................................................
2
L: 6Lent 6 6forty days6 (1.5)
C: 6Lent6
A: given up 6cho 6colate6 for Lent (.) I’ve given it up 6as well 6 I
...............................................................................................................................................
3
L:
C:
A: knew someone that (.) gave up chocolate for Lent and never went back
...............................................................................................................................................
4
L: I know I would like 
C:
A: to it (.) I wish I could do that (.)
In excerpt (14), Cassie uses I know to mark as dominant discourse Celia’s
“rule” regarding the incompatibility of spending a lot of time with a person and
saying negative things about her. It is notable that, having positioned herself as
dominant by marking and claiming knowledge of the dominant discourse, she
then proceeds to develop the discourse herself. This is evidence of the reactive
nature of the use of I know in MCG.
(14) Participants: Tim, Celia, Cassie and Libby.
1
T: 6yeah who I
Ce: 6a sad cow 6
Ca: sad 6girl 6 6oh hold on who
Li: 6what6 are you getting letters 6from girlies now6 (.)
...............................................................................................................................................
2
T: don’t even know6
Ce:  oo6oohh 6 
Ca: who wrote this 6 who wrote this Michelle   bitch (.)
Li: 6take it round6
...............................................................................................................................................
3
T:
Ce: cousin (.) 6her she’s always 6 hanging around with her cousin so she
Ca: 6her cousin’s a bitch6
Li: [laughs]
...............................................................................................................................................
4
T:
Ce: can 6just shut up 6  she (.) walks round all the time with her (.)
Ca: 6yeah I know6 sorry 
Li:
...............................................................................................................................................
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5
T:
Ce:
Ca: she’s calling her own 6cousin a bitch and she goes to school with her
Li: 6can I please read it cause I don’t know who it’s
...............................................................................................................................................
6
T:
Ce: yeah (.)
Ca: every day6
Li: from 6 (.)
I know as a tool in crossing peer group boundaries
During excerpt (15), the girls are looking at a magazine about skateboarding. At
the time of data collection, skaters are a visible subgroup of adolescents as a
whole and are considered particularly style-conscious. Anna is the only one of
the speakers who is a skater, so it is likely that Alison does not in fact know that
these ones are cool. She uses I know to align herself with skater discourse and by
extension position herself as cool:
(15) Participants: Anna and Alison.
1
A: I like these ones they’re cool (.) yeah they’re wicked
Al: yeah I know (.)
Excerpt (16) suggests that Anna considers her full membership in the skating
peer group actually to dilute her membership in the general adolescent peer
group. At a point when all speakers are concurring once again on the adolescent
norm of denying oneself chocolate (all say yeah, and Alison adds it’s hard ),
Anna is the only speaker who uses I know, perhaps because she is the only speaker
who feels the need to mark explicitly her knowledge that this is dominant
discourse.
(16) Participants: Cassie, Anna, Jill, Alison and Lily.
1
C: not eat chocolate near me cause it’s like I really want to eat it (.)
A:
J:
Al:
L:
...............................................................................................................................................
2
C:
A: 6yeah6 6I know 6 (.)
J: 6yeah6
Al: 6yeah6 6it’s hard6 (.)
L: 6yeah6
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As well as having her membership diluted by being a skater, if we consider choc-
olate denial to be more a case of “doing adolescent femininity” than simply “do-
ing adolescence,” there may be an issue of gender identity here as well. The vast
majority of skaters are boys, so Anna may feel relatively more obliged to “prove”
her femininity than the non-skating girls do.
Revisiting previous literature on I know in the light of this analysis
Above I concluded that previous literature on I know suggests an analysis in
which it functions as a supportive device that encourages the continuation of the
conversation. I know appears to serve a more complex function than this for the
speakers in MCG. Supportive devices are other-oriented, encouraging the cur-
rent speaker to continue. The present analysis shows that the use of I know to
create a link between previous speaker and current speaker can be seen to ben-
efit both speakers. In fact, it could be argued that the examples of I know in this
article in fact benefit the speaker more than the hearer. Bernstein’s (1974) re-
search into the discursive styles of middle-class and working-class adolescents
may be useful here. Although he does not write specifically on I know, he ob-
serves that the first person pronoun is used more frequently by the middle-class
young people whereas the second person and third person pronouns are used
more frequently by the working-class young people. In addition, he points out
that self-referring expressions such as I think are used more frequently by the
middle-class young people, while sympathetic circularity sequences (SCs), such
as you know, are used more frequently by the working-class young people. This
may suggest that the differential usage of I know and you know by the young
people discussed in this article may suggest differential orientation toward ego-
centric and sociocentric modes of interaction, which Bernstein claims are encour-
aged by socialization into the relevant class background. That said, Bernstein
claims that SCs request affirmation and signal feelings of “uncertainty of the
appropriateness of the message.” You know in my data does not signal either of
these things. This difference could well be to do with the context: Bernstein’s
young people were discussing a rather formal topic in a relatively formal situa-
tion, whereas mine were experiencing informality on both counts.
T H E U S E O F I KNOW B Y T H E Y O U N G P E O P L E I N W C G
The young people in WCG also use I know to signal knowledge of peer group
norms, although they do not use it nearly as often as the young people in MCG,
and their use of I know would appear to be more closely related to their use of
you know than it is to MCG’s use of I know. The marked usage occurs because
there are specific reasons why it is necessary to break out of the regular pattern,
often because the speaker has been challenged and therefore has to state some-
thing defensively rather than proactively. This can be seen in the following ex-
ample. While MCG use I know to mark what someone else has said as dominant
discourse, here Maria uses it to mark what she herself has said as dominant dis-
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course. Maria says that if you say you hate someone you must not mean it. Donna
mocks this, and Maria claims that it was in fact logical and relevant by using I
know. The context is that Kevin has the tape recorder and appears to be encour-
aging speakers to disclose their dislike of other members of the group.
(17) Participants: Kevin, Maria, Donna, and Richard.
1
K: no you know you know s- you know sometimes you know
M:
D:
...............................................................................................................................................
2
K: sometimes you know when you’re having (.h) 6a- an argument and you’re
M:
D:
...............................................................................................................................................
3
K: really angry what do you say about them (.)
M:  I hate you but I don’t
D: [indec0.5.] 
...............................................................................................................................................
4
K: hate who though (.) whatever one I had an
M: mean it (.)
D:
R: Kevin (.)
...............................................................................................................................................
5
K: 6argument with6 
M: I know because [?like if you cuss you]
m D:  ‘I didn’t mean it’ (.)
R: 6Kevin man s-6 
...............................................................................................................................................
6
K:
M: go to hell (.)
D:
R:
...............................................................................................................................................
m: Donna produces the words in ‘. . .’ in a mocking voice.
C O N C L U S I O N S
Processes of identity construction: Similar or different?
I have shown that the members of the two peer groups I have studied explicitly
mark their knowledge of dominant discourses by their use of you know and I
know, and that in so doing they reproduce these discourses. This is evidence that
knowing the norms of the group, or not being a deviant, are important to both
groups of young people who use these forms.
I would claim that the use of both you know and I know in my data could be
seen as “comparative acts” (Seltzer 1989:60). Seltzer describes a “peer” as a
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“counterpart” (1989:21). She suggests that during the time that adolescents in-
teract in peer groups, their selves are not distinct. She further claims that adoles-
cents build their identities through engaging in “comparative acts” with their
peers (1989:60). In both groups I have studied, speakers compare their knowl-
edge with that of hearers. In the case of you know, the speaker does not simply
present knowledge; she or he also claims that the hearer’s knowledge is compa-
rable to the speaker’s own. In the case of I know, the current speaker claims to
have the same knowledge as the previous speaker and as such compares herself
or himself favorably with that speaker.
That said, the differing status of the hearer in each case is interesting. Speak-
ers in WCG do not use you know to request acknowledgment from the hearer.
Why, then, not say I know X as opposed to X you know? Speaker knowledge
would still be expressed. It would appear that the speaker, as well as claiming
her or his own “knowledge” of the point in question, also wishes to claim the
hearer’s knowledge of the same. I would claim that this presents the knowledge
in the first instance as group knowledge rather than individual knowledge, and
as such makes it more readily acceptable as dominant discourse. It may appear,
therefore, that dominant discourses are reproduced in an active manner by this
group: The discourse is voiced, and the hearers are party to it unless they chal-
lenge this position in the following utterance. MCG’s process, in contrast, seems
more reactive. First, the speaker who says I know has waited for another speaker
to voice the potential dominant discourse and then claimed knowledge. Second,
the speaker to whom the speaker of I know reacts does not personally claim that
her or his utterance is dominant discourse. Thus, the status of any utterance as
knowledge is provided by someone other than the speaker who produced that
utterance. We can see this as a collaborative venture in which no participant
need take full responsibility for claiming that something is dominant discourse.
To end the analysis here is to simplify matters, however. On the majority of
occasions on which speakers in WCG use you know, they reproduce the domi-
nant discourse indirectly. They are generally talking about other people’s
deviant behavior. They therefore claim non-membership in the deviant
group. Membership in the dominant group is therefore only claimed by extension.
Wider claims: The relationship between economic conditions
and symbolic identity construction
My main aim has been to analyze the group dynamics of these two groups in
terms of what they suggest about individual processes of identity construction.
However, I would put forward a tentative claim that the processes of identity
construction evidenced in this data show the speakers making sense of social
class and gender positions in the wider society. Foucault 1977, whose work I
have drawn upon here, recognizes that dominant discourses and power relations
develop into recognizable structures in society. Also useful here is Bourdieu &
Passeron’s (1970) notion of “reproduction”: While individuals and groups con-
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struct their identities in interaction, the resources they draw upon while doing so
are very much tied up with material reality. So the likelihood remains that, while
dominant knowledge can be challenged, society will be reproduced in a similar
fashion.
I would claim that the speakers who use I know (the middle-class speakers)
see themselves as potentially inhabiting a dominant position in society because
of their families’ (upper) middle-class status. That said, their conversational be-
havior illustrated in this article suggests that they remain markedly insecure in
regard to this positioning, perhaps because, as young people, they have not yet
been able to inhabit it in their own right. They do not actively position them-
selves as dominant: They reactively identify with a dominant position in order
not to jeopardize their potential social positioning. The speakers who use you
know (the working-class speakers), I would claim, are aware that the likelihood
of their gaining a dominant position in the future is not as great as it may be for
some others. They therefore actively construct dominant positions for them-
selves locally within the group. These are constructed relationally by defining
other speakers or third parties as deviant.
There are two notable points to observe in relation to this. First, it is predom-
inantly the working-class boys who use you know to construct dominant posi-
tions. The working-class girls do use it on occasion, but only when a boy has set
the pattern previously. You know does not appear in all-girl talk in this group, so
we can surmise that the girls use different strategies to position themselves un-
less they are reacting to boys’ strategies. Second, although I have claimed that
the boys are reacting to their position within the social class structure, they do
not subvert this, or even voice any recognition of it. Instead, they base their
dominance on gender and ethnicity. They often construct themselves as domi-
nant in relation to a deviant female. This is particularly clear in Jay and Maria’s
dyads. In Richard’s discussion of his sexual relations with an Indian girl, he sets
“Indian” up as a deviant position and suggests that the Indian girl is even more
deviant because she is a girl. When Jay places Jason in a deviant position, it is
not on account of his being middle-class: instead, he projects onto that identity a
homosexual identity and constructs the homosexual identity as deviant. This again
relates to Eckert’s (1995) finding that adolescents reproduce society broadly along
recognizable social class lines, but they do not voice their difference from others
along those lines, instead reproducing group-specific categories.
So, to conclude finally, I claim that the speakers in the groups I have studied
use the pragmatic particles you know (WCG) and I know (MCG) both to show
their knowledge of the dominant discourses and norms of the group and to re-
produce these. Both groups of speakers can be seen to be engaging in compara-
tive acts, and such acts have been documented as playing a significant part in
adolescents’ identity construction. The use of you know shows relatively active
identity construction while the use of I know shows relatively reactive identity
construction, but both groups construct their identities indirectly. In reproducing
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relationships and dominant discourses within the peer groups, the young people
can be seen to draw upon aspects of wider society, and there is an interesting
interplay of issues of social class, gender, sexuality, and ethnicity in their
discourse.
N O T E S
1The transcription conventions I have used are as follows:
(.) micropause
(1.0) timed pause
(.h) in breath
(h) outbreath
me- unfinished word
horrible stressed syllable
6 . . . 6
6 . . . 6 . . . overlapping speech
[ . . . ] indecipherable speech with time or estimated content stated
* marks the utterance in which the linguistic feature under discussion occurs.
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